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1. Introduction and Motivation 
Emerging Augmented Reality (AR) technologies display three-dimensional content (e.g., 
images or sound) overlaid on a user’s perception of the physical world. This content is laid 
out around a user in the same spatial coordinates as the physical objects surrounding her 
or him, and with interaction techniques that approximate interactions with physical-world 
objects (e.g., grabbing and moving them). AR technologies are becoming increasingly 
sophisticated, with examples appearing in head-mounted displays (HMDs) and on 
automotive windshields.  
 
With its augmentation of the physical world, AR offers the possibility to benefit users as 
they perform real-world tasks. For example, manufacturers can superimpose assembly 
instructions on the physical artifact they are building, showing what action to perform next; 
surgeons can have 3D scans of a patient’s body overlaid on the actual part of the body they 
describe; or soldiers in the battlefield can have information about the ongoing mission and 
markers to help spot key landmarks in the field (as those seen guiding the fictional 
character Tony Stark in the Iron Man movies). Today, these technologies are no longer 
science fiction but rapidly becoming commercially available. 
 
While AR technologies can and will provide numerous positive benefits to users, history has 
taught us that as technologies mature, those technologies can become more attractive to 
computer security adversaries. ,  Adversaries might author programs that appear in an AR 1 2
technology’s App Store, or they might exploit a vulnerability in an AR application and 
thereby cause it to misbehave. To minimize the potential impact of these adversaries in the 
future, it is important and valuable to consider what undesirable things ​might​ happen if 
adversaries manifest in AR environments, and to do so ​before​ the adversaries manifest. By 
considering possible adversaries early, it is possible for the AR and computer security 
communities to take proactive steps to mitigate against possible future threats. 
 
The computer security community has already started to consider several classes of 
computer security risks for AR technologies. For example, prior works consider privacy 
implications with an AR technology's use of continuous sensors, like cameras, as well as 
mechanisms to minimize undesirable privacy exposures. , , ,  Other prior works consider 3 4 5 6
methods to regulate an AR technology’s output, ,  to minimize the likelihood of an AR HMD 7 8
directly blocking a user’s perception of the physical world  or overlaying deceptive or 9
distracting content (e.g., obscuring or modifying a real-world road sign). A recent paper 
surveys the broader space of research in security and privacy for AR.  10
 
Our Focus: Sensory and Perceptual Impact. ​The above-cited works consider security 
risks with AR technologies, but do so from a largely computer science perspective and do 
not consider the intimate relationship between AR technologies and the user’s brain. 
However, as AR technologies become more sophisticated, they will engage with the brain in 
a way that is much deeper than traditional computing devices.  AR technologies offer a 11
much deeper perceptual representation of space and engagement of sensory-motor 
mechanisms than traditional computer platforms. In AR, the user interface is deployed in 
the 3D space around the user and can allow direct manipulation of digital content along 
with the physical content that shares the user’s workspace. With the power and 
sophistication of emerging and future AR technologies comes the possibility of a 
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compromised or malicious app introducing digital content into the user’s rich, 
multi-sensory environment, and thereby interfering with a user’s perceptual and cognitive 
performance,creating potential short- and long-term effects in the user’s perception, 
cognition and motor responses.  
 
This paper makes two key contributions: 
1. First, we initiate a line of inquiry around the hitherto unexplored area of ​potential 
threats from augmented reality to a user’s perception, cognition, and motor responses.  
2. Second, we provide an ​initial framework for evaluating these potential threats 
according to a set of criteria we develop (e.g., type, longevity, and selectivity of the 
sensory and perceptual impact).  
 
We encourage AR and computer security researchers as well as cognitive neuroscientists to 
critically evaluate the spectrum of threats within this framework, as well as the framework 
itself. We further encourage proactive consideration of these risks by all relevant 
stakeholders -- neuroscientists, computer security experts, researchers, and industry -- 
before any adversaries manifest. 
 
Context. ​Our work is squarely at the intersection between AR, computer security, and 
neuroscience. To conduct this research, we composed a team of experts from all three 
communities. Our framework reflects our understanding of neuroscience, perception, and 
computer security threat modeling. For example, much of our discussions derive from a 
long line of literature in perceptual psychology and neuroscience, with a key difference 
being that in our work we consider the adversarial uses and extensions of those prior 
results. Note the views in this paper reflect those of the authors’ academic perspective, and 
not of the organizations they work for. 
 
2. Case Studies: Sensory and Perceptual Risks 
from AR 
We begin by presenting several hypothetical case studies of ​potential​ perceptual issues that 
may arise due to bugs, accidents, or explicit malice in AR applications or technologies. In 
the subsequent section, we then take a computer security perspective and discuss ​how 
such attacks might manifest in practice. Later, we use these case studies to drive the 
development of a conceptual framework for perceptual AR attacks. 
 
Background: On Sensory and Perceptual Phenomena. ​Human sensory and perceptual 
systems are the portals through which we experience the world and build our reality. We 
define as ​Sensory​ all the processing occurring peripherally, at the site of the sensors (e.g., 
the retina in the eye, the cochlea in the ear). We define as ​Perception​ the processes that 
transform sensations into information as the neural signal reaches the brain -- in particular 
the cerebral cortex, where these complex operations will eventually deliver the final 
experience and the performance that follows. Most of the human decisions are made in 
real time based on our sensation and perception. The correct position and functioning of 
our bodies in space and the efficacy of our actions depend on the input we collect and 
integrate through our senses and our perceptual systems.  
 
As we explore in this paper, AR systems can potentially deliver systematic distortions to the 
information we perceive. Because of the immersive nature of these technologies and the 
fact that they engage with our sensory, motor, and cognitive systems in a much deeper way 
than traditional interfaces, any perturbation to the way people perceive the world may 
have consequences on behavior that are deeper, and potentially more dramatic, than other 
traditional technologies (e.g., smartphones). Moreover, because wearable AR is best 
applied as an augmentation of our capacity to access relevant information and perform in 
a variety of demanding real world tasks (e.g., surgery, military operations, assembly, 
navigation, etc.), it is critical to understand in detail how these tasks can be affected by 
altering the experience of wearable AR users. 
 
Classes of Phenomena. ​In our example case studies below, we will talk in more detail 
about three different phenomena, or classes of phenomena: ​Photosensitive Epilepsy​, 
which is a simple paradigmatic case of how the delivery of sensory stimulations can 
generate harm to users; the vast class of sensory and perceptual ​Adaptation​ phenomena, 
in which dosed exposures to some stimuli impact on the perception of other stimuli; and 
some effects and illusions in the domain of ​Motion​ perception, as AR interfaces and their 
background are in continuous motion and users need to interpret these motion signals 
correctly to safely interact with the physical world.  
 
These three case studies are by no means exhaustive of the potential threats. Rather, they 
serve to give an initial taste of the potential impact of introducing malicious sensory stimuli 
to users via a wearable (e.g., head-mounted display) or other immersive device (e.g., an 
automotive AR windshield). 
Case Study 1: Photosensitive Epilepsy (PSE) 
On December 16, 1997 the Japanese television station TV Tokyo aired an episode of the 
cartoon “Pocket Monster”.  That evening, 685 children in Tokyo were reported to have 12
been seen by physicians and about one quarter of them were admitted to the hospital. The 
visual content of that specific episode contained a flickering pattern that generated 
convulsions, headache, nausea, general malaise, eye irritation with blurred vision, and 
seizures. Most of these children had experienced ​photosensitive epilepsy (PSE)​, a form of 
stimulus-induced epilepsy that has an incidence of up to 10% of all new cases of epilepsy 
12
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detected in the 7-19 years old range.  Several other reports can be found about video 13
games, pinball machines, or television shows as triggers for this condition. Though some 
such exposures are accidental, adversaries have, in the past, deliberately attempted to 
cause harm to people with photosensitive epilepsy, e.g., in 2008 adversaries placed flashing 
images on the Epilepsy Foundation website  and in 2016 a journalist was targeted with a 14
tweet that successfully induced an epileptic seizure.  15
 
Risk in AR. ​AR technologies could be leveraged by adversaries to trigger PSE. What is very 
compelling is the simplicity of this trigger. High contrast visual stimuli flickering at temporal 
frequencies between 10 and 20 Hz are the most likely patterns to activate PSE. The number 
of people that could be impacted by this is quite limited, but we believe this is a 
paradigmatic and clearly documented potential harm that can be introduced in a relatively 
easy fashion by the images displayed with AR technologies.  While it is unknown what the 
full impact of an immersive and wide field of view AR system might have on the delivery of 
a PSE trigger, we argue that it is important to consider and address this and similar risks 
before any threats manifest. 
Case Study 2: Adaptation 
Sensation and perception are incredibly complex systems in the human brain. One of the 
most compelling features comes from the fact that our sensory systems adjust their 
response (“gain”) dynamically to adapt to the context they are operating in. ​Adaptation and 
aftereffects  are changes in the sensitivity of our sensory and perceptual responses 16
induced by some form of sustained exposure to specific visual stimuli. For example, when 
we spend some time in a place with a low luminance level, say our dimly lit bedroom, we 
become adapted to its luminance range, and it will take a while and a little visual distress to 
re-adapt after we switch the light on. This well-known visual phenomenon occurs in a 
comparable fashion in the auditory domain.  17
 
Adaptation phenomena are pervasive in our perceptual and cognitive behavior, and they 
occur at many different levels of the processing pipeline. The above examples (light and 
audio adaption) are examples of low-level forms of adaptation. However, adaptation occurs 
and has surprisingly similar manifestations in higher-level aspects of our perceptual 
cognition, such as for the perception of faces and facial expressions, biological motion, 
13 J. A. Quirk, D. R. Fish, S. J. Smith, J. W. Sander, S. D. Shorvon, P.J. Allen. “Incidence of photosensitive epilepsy: a 
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numerosity (e.g., estimating the size of a crowd), affordance (e.g., matching objects with the 
action towards it), and navigation (moving around in the environment), and so forth.    18
 
Moreover, adaptation is observable in non-visual sensory modalities and in the motor 
system. Particularly relevant and striking is the case of prism adaptation, in which people 
who see the world through a prism for long enough will experience severe 
perceptual-motor disconnections that are coherent with a sensory-motor remapping to 
match the optical distortions of the world. For example, a person’s brain will, after some 
time, adapt to an upside-down prism by remapping his or her actions to this flipped world. 
In an excerpt of the TV show “Brain Games”, Prof. Daniel Simons show how basketball 
players are impacted by this effect.   19
 
Of particular interest to our article is not only that adaptation manifests itself across most 
of the sensory and motor domains, but also that its effect can be observed at many 
different timescales depending on the adapting stimuli. For example, when the prism 
distortion described above is removed (e.g., a person’s perception of the world is returned 
to rightside-up), it takes time to re-adapt. As another example, the well-known McCollough 
effect  -- a visual effect in which staring at one image for a period of time causes a person 20
to see colors in an otherwise black-and-white image of a specific type -- is known to impact 
a person’s false perception of colors in that black and white image for hours to months, 
depending on the adaptation schedule of the experimental protocol.    21
 
 
Figure 1: Images for inducing McCollough Effect (adapted from Ramachandran and Marcus, 
2017 ). ​Warning: this effect can be long-lasting (hours to months). 22
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Risk in AR. ​Specific “doses” of adapting stimuli, delivered by a malicious or compromised 
AR application, may similarly affect a user’s perception for either a short or long (or 
possibly permanent) period of time. Such effects could even be done in a way that the user 
is unaware of them -- like, for example, a subtle shift of the distribution of chromatic profile 
in the display. Imagine military operations in the field, where small shifts of patterns and 
color make the difference between your fellow soldiers and your enemies in a generally 
camouflaged visual scene.  “Hacking” the color pattern of the Head-Up Display may, for 
example, dramatically impact the user’s color perception and, consequently, the crucial 
decision making that relies on color and pattern discrimination. 
Case Study 3: Motion, Sensory Transients, and Motion-Induced 
Blindness 
A flying insect in the visual periphery captures our attention even when we are intensely 
engaged in another activity. So do transient, sudden stimuli like sharp loud sounds, flashes, 
or objects that hit us. An incredible computational design in the brain ensures that we 
process all the motion signals that we sense and use those signals in the proper coordinate 
system to allow us to navigate environment, avoid obstacles, estimate time to contact, and 
pay attention to potential dangers.   23
 
Risk in AR.​ Moving and temporally modulated stimuli can be used maliciously, to disrupt a 
user during the execution of delicate tasks. For example, “malicious” motion signals 
delivered through the visual and the auditory channels could act as stimuli to distract from 
the task, or to mask and distort perception of task-relevant motion signals from the 
physical world. Ultimately, such an attack could even perturb postures and locomotion of 
users. Most directly, others have raised concerns about how AR content can obstruct a 
user’s perception of the physical world, e.g., by blocking or otherwise impairing central or 
peripheral vision.  24
 
As a more subtle effect, we find particularly compelling the case of Motion Induced 
Blindness  that can be demoed online at ​http://www.michaelbach.de/ot/mot-mib/​. In this 25
perceptual phenomenon, perfectly visible motion signals disappear from sight for a 
significant interval -- long enough, for example, to impair the estimate of a trajectory of an 
object moving at us. In the AR context, the threat may be represented by an introduced 
motion pattern that causes relevant moving objects in the physical world to disappear. An 
AR system could use eye tracking to, for example, ensure that the induced pattern was 
always in a certain region of the person’s visual perception. In another case, motion 
23 D. C. Burr. “Motion Perception, Elementary Mechanisms.” In ​The Handbook of Brain Theory and Neural 
Networks​, Second Edition. MIT Press, 2004 
24 E. E. Sabelman and R. Lam. "The Real-Life Dangers of Augmented Reality." In ​IEEE Spectrum​, 2015. 
25 Y. S. Bonneh, A. Cooperman, and D. Sagi. “Motion-induced blindness in normal observers.” In ​Nature​, 
411(6839), 798-801, 2001. 
presented in the periphery of the visual field could be misused to draw a user’s attention to 
that region, and away from more important information in the center of the visual field.  26
 
While AR is new, the threats raised here have deep historical roots. For example, in the 
physical security space, it is well known that adversaries -- in particular, pickpockets -- can 
exploit a person’s tactile perception system to achieve a malicious goal. Namely, one 
common technique that pickpockets use is to bump the victim somewhere on their body, 
drawing the victim’s attention to the bump, and then steal from the victim’s pocket at the 
same time. 
 
3. A Computer Security Perspective 
In this paper, we take a computer security perspective on AR-based sensory and perceptual 
risks like those exemplified by the above case studies. Before presenting our framework for 
evaluating such possible threats in the next subsection, we step back to discuss ​how​ such 
risks ​might​ manifest into attacks against real AR users. We stress, however, that such 
threats have not yet manifested today -- rather, our goal is to look ahead and anticipate 
such issues before they arise in real AR technologies and applications. 
 
 
Figure 2: Conceptual AR Platform. 
 
 
We first describe a possible AR platform at a conceptual level, which consists of hardware 
and software components. The hardware includes both sensors (e.g., RGB and depth 
cameras, accelerometers, gyroscopes and magnetometers, microphones, eye trackers, 
biosensors, thermal sensors) and a display, which may take the form of (for example) a 
26
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head-mounted display, an automotive windshield, or a smartphone screen. The software 
includes both the platform’s operating system (OS) as well as any applications running on 
top of it. These applications process sensor input and produce output in the form of digital 
(audio, visual, or haptic) content to be overlaid on the user’s perception of the physical 
world. Applications may be written by developers trusted by the platform designers (e.g., 
other teams within an automotive company) or by untrusted third-party developers (e.g., 
who make their applications available in an App Store, similar to today’s smartphone 
ecosystems). 
 
Our focus in this paper is on the potential sensory and perceptual threats that can arise 
from the output produced by AR technologies -- for example, output that triggers epileptic 
seizures or motion-induced blindness. Possible intentional or unintentional “attackers” 
include the AR platform or OS itself, installed applications, or other users (e.g., when using 
collaborative applications that allow one user to create content that another user can see). 
Such “attacks” can occur either by ​accident​ -- e.g., due to bugs in a trusted application, or 
because two AR applications interacted in an unexpected way -- or due to ​explicit​ ​malice​ -- 
e.g., when a user accidentally installs a malicious (or compromised) application from the 
app store.  
 
We again stress that our exploration in this paper is of ​potential​ threats. It is unlikely that 
most of these concerns will manifest in the AR technologies commercially available today; 
rather, our goal is to encourage current and future AR platform designers to think about 
these issues in advance, before AR technologies become interesting targets for real 
adversaries. We also highlight that computer security is fundamentally about risk 
management. No system can be perfectly secure against all possible adversaries, and 
system designers must balance security against other goals, including functionality and 
usability. Just because an attack might be possible does not mean that the risk of this 
attack is high. For example, the risk of a given attack may be low because it requires a 
sophisticated, highly motivated adversary with significant resources, or because the 
potential victim and/or harm is not of sufficient interest to the adversary.  
 
4. Framework for Sensory and Perceptual Risks 
In this section, we draw on the above case studies, and our computer security perspective, 
to develop a conceptual framework for classifying potential perceptual and physiological 
risks and threats in AR. We then use this framework to evaluate a set of concrete examples 
in the subsequent section (see Table 1).  
 
Our goal in developing this framework is to lay the groundwork for future work that studies 
and defends against these types of risks, e.g., to help such work anticipate risks and 
prioritize those that are more likely to arise in practice and/or that will result in greater 
harm to users. 
 
We define our framework along the following axes: 
 
Impact. ​What aspect of the user’s perception and cognition is impacted by the attack? 
Possible impacts include manipulating a user’s perception (visual, acoustic, or haptic), 
motor control, attention, higher-level decision making, beliefs, emotions, or memory. In this 
paper, we focus primarily on ​sensory and perceptual​ risks (as in the case studies above), 
rather than threats to higher-level brain functions like memory or decision-making. Future 
work should also consider such higher-level threats in more depth. 
 
Threat Vector. ​How is the attack delivered to the user? Malicious or harmful stimuli may 
be presented in visual, audio, or haptic form. All of our case studies above involve threats 
via visual input, but similar risks can arise via other input modalities (e.g., adaptation to 
auditory stimuli). 
 
Time to Impact. ​How long does it take for the impacts of the attack to take effect? For 
example, for some type of adaptation to occur one needs an “adapter stimulus” that lasts 
at least 30 seconds. In some cases, an attacker may deliberately deploy an attack over a 
longer period of time to reduce the likelihood that the user notices the attack, e.g., by 
gradually changing the delta between the real world and the augmented world over time. 
 
Longevity of Impact. ​How long do the effects of the attack last? For example, some attacks 
may have only short-term sensory or perceptual impacts (e.g., temporary motion 
blindness), while others (e.g., the McCollough Effect) can last up to months; some effects, 
particularly if applied during critical periods of brain development, may be permanent. For 
example, in a future when these technologies are pervasive throughout the population, 
malicious content could deprive young users of certain sensory experiences and perturb 
their neural development and plasticity (e.g., permanently affecting their ability to perceive 
certain types of visual information).  Any effects that last beyond the application of the 27
attack stimulus are particularly dangerous because they mean that users -- even if they 
detect an attack -- cannot return themselves to a normal state simply by removing or 
disabling the AR device. 
 
Vulnerable Population.​ Which users, under which conditions, are vulnerable to the attack? 
For example, attacks targeting people vulnerable to epileptic seizures are effective only 
against such users, while a more general population is vulnerable to motion-induced 
blindness. The population vulnerable to a given attack may vary by age (e.g., children in a 
27 D. Ellemberg, T. L. Lewis and D. Maurer. “Repeated measurements of contrast sensitivity reveal limits to visual 
plasticity after early binocular deprivation in humans.” In ​Neuropsychologia​, 44(11): 2104-12, 2006. 
critical developmental period ), vision, genetic condition, profession (e.g., military or 28
medical applications of AR), current physiological or psychological state (e.g., tired or 
drunk), etc. And further, will the attacker be able to know whether a potential victim is in 
the vulnerable population ​before​ initiating the attack (e.g., by collecting data from the AR 
device’s biosensor or using auxiliary data about the user)? 
 
Attack Source. ​What is the source of the threat, i.e., what actor is the cause of the threat? 
Attacks may result from a compromised operating system, from malware or 
vulnerable/compromised applications, from third-party content (e.g., ads) within an 
application, from other users (e.g., in a collaborative AR setting), or due to errors, bugs, or 
accidents on the part of OS or application developers. 
 
Attack Certainty. ​We might have high confidence that an attack will be effective given 
current knowledge in computer security and neuroscience. Others attacks one might posit 
as being possible but would require additional (ethical) experimentation in order to fully 
gauge their feasibility and impact. 
 
User Awareness. ​Can users be aware that the attack is occurring, perhaps early enough to 
mitigate the attack? Can users be aware that the attack ​has​ occurred? For example, users 
may not be aware that they have failed to perceive something due to motion-induced 
blindness, while they will certainly be aware of an epileptic seizure.  
 
System Awareness. ​Can the ongoing or completed attack’s effects on the user be 
observed externally, e.g., by biometric sensors incorporated into the AR platform? For 
example, tracking a user’s eye movements, heart rate, or other physiological responses 
may give indication that an attack is occurring. Note that this capability could be used both 
defensively (i.e., to detect and alert users to an attack) or offensively (to determine attack 
success and/or optimize an attack). 
 
5. Survey of Potential Sensory and Perceptual 
Threats from AR 
Table 1 (see Appendix) surveys the broader space of potential sensory and perceptual 
threats in a “cheat sheet” format for practical access, and demonstrates how each threat 
can be evaluated according to the framework developed in the previous section. This table 
also includes our case studies from above, and provides major references to expand on 
each topic. 
28 J. O. Bailey and J. N. Bailenson. “Immersive virtual reality and the developing child.” In P. Brooks and F. 
Blumberg (Eds.), ​Cognitive Development in Digital Contexts​ (p181-200). Elsevier, 2017. 
6. Discussion and Future Directions 
Finally, we step back and discuss key directions for future work suggested by our 
exploration. 
 
Experimental Evaluation.​ In this paper, we have conceptually considered potential 
sensory and perceptual harms due to AR, based on our understanding of prior literature in 
perceptual psychology and neuroscience. It will also be critical to experimentally validate,  
and further evaluate according to our proposed framework, potential AR-based threats to 
human perception, physiology, and cognition. Experimentally evaluating the differences 
between AR and other avenues of perceptual attack is also important: for which perceptual 
attacks does AR provide a unique opportunity for attackers (e.g., due to AR’s immersive 
nature or wide field-of-view), and how effective can these attacks be in practice? Any such 
experimentation must be done both ethically and safely. 
 
Additional Neuro-Cognitive Threats​. In our case studies, as well as Table 1, we have 
focused primarily on perceptual threats, as an initial exploration of this space. Future work 
must also consider higher-level effects on the human neuro-cognitive system, including 
effects on cognition, decision-making, emotion, and memory. Our goal in proposing the 
evaluation framework above is for other AR, neuroscience, and/or computer security 
researchers to apply and expand this framework as well as Table 1. 
 
Future AR Technologies. ​As AR technologies continue to advance, they may pose 
additional threats or increase the potential risks or likelihoods of the threats we have 
identified. For example, future AR platforms may include more and improved biosensors 
like eye tracking , pupillometry, galvanic skin response (GSR), electroencephalogram (EEG), 
heart rate; they may also have improved output capabilities (e.g., wider field of view, tactile 
feedback), as well as a potential for human-like, photo-realistic digital assistants, which 
project the risk of brain “hacks” to higher level functions like decision-making. 
 
Defenses. ​Our ultimate goal in raising and exploring potential AR-based risks to the human 
brain is to prevent such risks from manifesting in the next generation of AR technologies. 
By anticipating and understanding these risks, our hope is that AR technology designers 
can take them into account and proactively develop defenses against them ​before​ such 
risks arise in practice. For example, possible defensive directions include: 
● Equipping an AR platform or operating system to monitor for physiological or other 
signals (e.g., heart rate) that can detect a user’s abnormal reactions and flag 
potential attacks when they begin taking effect. 
● Designing the AR platform or operating system to mediate and validate any output 
that applications attempt to generate, to detect signatures for potential (accidental 
or intentional) attacks. Prior work in the computer security community has already 
considered the role of the AR’s operating system in managing output from 
applications,  but it has not studied in depth how to do so to prevent attacks of the 29
sensory and perceptual nature we discuss in this paper. 
● Vetting AR applications submitted to an App Store via static and/or dynamic 
analysis, to detect potential sensory or perceptual risks and/or violation of app 
development guidelines, and proactively removing from the App Store applications 
that are found to be problematic once already deployed. 
● Rules about the nature of content that is safe for the perception of ​other​ users when 
AR is used collaboratively among multiple users. (For example, as when a group of 
people share a meal and must know others’ dietary restrictions, one user’s AR 
device may take into account the fact that another user is predisposed to 
photosensitive epilepsy before sharing virtual content.)  
 
7. Conclusion 
Rapidly advancing AR technologies are in a unique position to directly mediate between the 
human brain and the physical world. Though this tight coupling presents tremendous 
opportunities for human augmentation, it also presents new risks due to potential 
adversaries, including AR applications or devices themselves, as well as bugs or accidents. 
In this paper, we have begun exploring potential risks to the human brain from augmented 
reality. Our initial focus has been on sensory and perceptual risks (e.g., accidentally or 
maliciously induced visual adaptations, motion-induced blindness, and photosensitive 
epilepsy), but similar risks may span both lower- and higher-level human brain functions, 
including cognition, memory, and decision-making. Though they have not yet manifested in 
practice in early-generation AR technologies, we believe that such risks are uniquely 
dangerous in AR due to the richness and depth with which it interacts with a user’s 
experience of the physical world. We propose a framework, based in computer security 
threat modeling, to conceptually and experimentally evaluate such risks. The ultimate goal 
of our work is to aid AR technology developers, researchers, and neuroscientists to 
consider these issues ​before​ AR technologies are widely deployed and become targets for 
real adversaries. By considering and addressing these issues now, we can help ensure that 
future AR technologies can meet their full, positive potential. 
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Appendix: Survey of Potential Sensory and Perceptual Threats from AR 
 
Table 1: Taxonomy of Potential Sensory and Perceptual Threats from Augmented Reality 
 
Threat Vector  Description of Impact  Attack Vector  Time for 
Delivery 
Time to 
Impact 
Longevity of 
Impact 
Vulnerable 
Population 
Attack 
Certainty 
User 
Awareness 
Temporal 
modulations​1 
Deliver high contrast stimuli at a high 
temporal frequency to generate 
photosensitive epilepsy and 
discomfort. 
Visual  Delivered over 
<1 minute. 
Seconds, 
Minutes 
Seconds,Days  Predisposed 
people, more 
frequent in 
young 
Low 
(conditional 
on pre- 
disposition) 
Yes 
Visual fatigue​2  Repetitive or prolonged presentation 
of certain visual stimuli can generate 
visual distress and fatigue. 
Visual  Delivered over 
prolonged 
intervals and 
repetitive 
stimulation. 
Minutes, 
Hours 
Minutes, Hours  General. High 
risk for 
machine 
operators 
Medium  No 
Adaptation and 
illusions​3 
Present stimuli in any modality to 
adapt those senses so they are more 
sensitive to the opposite of the 
stimuli. See "Case Study 2". 
 
Visual, 
acoustic, 
haptic  
 
Delivered over 
various 
durations, from 
single flashes to 
minutes or 
hours. 
Seconds, 
Minutes, 
Hours 
Seconds to 
Days: Effect of 
variable 
duration 
sometimes 
correlated to 
the adapting 
phase duration. 
General. High 
risk for 
machine 
operators 
High  No 
Motion​4,5  Deliver motion signal unexpectedly 
in target areas of the field of vision 
to create attentional capture and 
distraction, disorientation, vection, 
and stimulus masking. 
Visual , 
acoustic 
Delivered over a 
few seconds. 
Seconds  Seconds to 
Days: Effect 
lasting over 
tens of seconds 
or less 
General. High 
risk for 
machine 
operators 
High  Conditional 
Attentional 
system​6 
Capture attention by popping up 
high salient stimulus as distraction. 
 
Visual , 
acoustic 
Delivered over 
short or very 
short intervals.  
Seconds  Seconds: Effect 
is generally 
instantaneous 
or short term 
(but secondary 
effects may be 
long lasting or 
permanent). 
General. High 
risk for 
machine 
operators 
High  Conditional 
Binocular 
disconnections​7 
Present incoherent stimuli in each 
eye to cause double image (diplopia), 
distance mis-estimations. 
Visual  Delivered in 
short or long 
duration. 
Seconds  Seconds, 
Minutes 
General. High 
risk for 
machine 
operators 
Low  Yes 
 
Binocular rivalry​8  Presenting different stimuli in two 
eyes can cause suppression of the 
information in one eye, thus cause 
disruption of stereo vision, 
disorientation, discomfort, priming, 
nausea. 
Visual   Delivered over 
short or very 
short intervals. 
Seconds, 
Minutes 
Seconds, 
Minutes 
General. High 
risk for 
machine 
operators 
High 
(conditional 
on intact 
stereo 
vision) 
Conditional 
Sound / acoustic 
attacks​9 
Deliver sound stimuli that may 
contain certain spatial cue or a 
certain sound frequency for a long 
period of time to cause temporal 
biases, spatial biases, tynnitus, 
hyperacusis. 
Acoustic  Delivered over 
short or very 
short intervals. 
Seconds  Seconds, 
Months 
General. High 
risk for 
machine 
operators 
Medium  Conditional 
Multisensory 
disconnections​10 
Present inconsistent stimuli from 
different sensory channels and 
cause confusion that includes spatial 
and temporal mislocalizations, 
disorientation, and Simulator 
Sickness (nausea). 
Visual, 
acoustic, 
haptic  
Delivered over 
short or very 
short intervals.  
Seconds, 
Minutes 
Seconds, 
Minutes 
General. High 
risk for 
machine 
operators 
High  No 
Sensory motor 
conflicts​11 
Introduce conflicting visual and 
motor cues to cause loss of accuracy 
of targeted movements such as 
reaching/ grasping. 
Motor  Delivered in 
short or long 
duration. 
Minutes  Minutes,  
Hours 
General. High 
risk for 
machine 
operators 
High   
Delusions / 
Hallucinations​12 
Overlay photorealistic images on top 
of real world scenes which distort 
the perception of reality. 
 
Visual, 
acoustic 
Delivered over 
prolonged 
intervals and 
repetitive 
stimulation.  
Seconds, 
Minutes 
Minutes, 
Lifetime: 
General  Low 
(conditional 
on pre- 
disposition) 
No 
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